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I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing security and dependability appear as essential challenges for industry and academia. Existing surveys show that Cloud Computing security is at the top of users' concerns [1] . Likewise, assuring high levels of dependability in Cloud computing remains a significant research challenge. Specifically, there is a need for developing holistic models for Cloud dependability evaluation [2] .
Previous works highlighted indicators of software aging accumulation in Cloud components [3] . Software aging is a cumulative process that can lead software to hangs or other failures [4] , whereas software rejuvenation is used to counteract software aging [5] . VM migration scheduling is an The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Pierluigi Gallo . approach to reduce the downtime related to VMM software rejuvenation [6] , [7] . However, potential security issues of applying VM migration as support for VMM rejuvenation are still not understood. Besides that, a security-aware software rejuvenation scheduling is hard to achieve due to the uncertainty related to security events [8] . Pietrantuono and Russo [9] also highlight the importance of studying the security impacts caused by software rejuvenation policies.
There are several studies on the availability evaluation of VM migration scheduling as support for VMM software rejuvenation [10] , [11] . Mainly, these aim at finding the optimal rejuvenation schedule to maximize system availability, but none of them deal with security issues. From a security perspective, there are also some works on VM migration security, as presented in [12] , for example. However, none of those covers software aging and rejuvenation aspects. VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Our work aims at evaluating the security impact caused by VM migration scheduling as support for VMM software rejuvenation. This paper intends to address the following research question:
RQ main -What is the security risk impact of applying different VM migration policies for VMM software rejuvenation purposes?
On top of this, we consider two sub-questions:
• RQ s1 -What is the VM migration policy that reduces the system security risk?
• RQ s2 -What are the trade-offs between availability and security when using VM migration scheduling as support for VMM rejuvenation?. To answer these questions, we propose an availability model based on Stochastic Rewards Nets (SRN) for systems with VM migration scheduling for VMM software rejuvenation purposes. The system architecture considered has three main components: VM -a virtual machine running the desired application; Main Node -a physical machine that hosts the VMs; and Standby Node -a physical machine used to receive VM migrations. The selected architecture covers the main components of virtualized environments. Indeed, complex virtualized infrastructures in Cloud Computing also have similar architectural components [11] , [13] .
From the proposed availability model, we extract a security measure named RiskScore. Instead of assuming the attacker behavior (which is very difficult to characterize), this metric is based on the time that the system spends on risky states (from a security perspective). The assumption is that the attack success is related to the time spent in a risky (or vulnerable) state. So, RiskScore metric captures the elapsed time in a condition (or state) which raises or enables a successful security attack. Therefore, as we have different preconditions for different security attacks, RiskScore calculation depends on the considered security threat (e.g., Denial of Service, Man-in-the-middle).
We present three case studies to validate our proposal. The first considers the Man-in-the-middle security threat, the second considers Denial of Service attacks, and the last one is a combination of both threats. We provide a set of scenarios in each case study covering different VM migration scheduling alternatives to support the analysis of the tradeoff between availability and security risk.
Availability is a dependability and also a security attribute [14] . This way, both dependability events (e.g., failures, crashes or hangs) and security events (e.g., malicious activities or security attacks) can affect system availability. However, in this paper, the availability evaluation is considered only from the dependability perspective. From the security perspective, we propose and evaluate the RiskScore, a metric focused on measuring the security risk (more details in Section II-D).
The highlights of this paper are:
• We propose a simple and flexible approach to support security evaluation considering different threats and using the same availability model;
• Results allow studying the VM migration policy that globally maximizes the security or availability levels;
• For each case study, we provide an extensive set of scenarios to support the decision-making process. Up to our knowledge, this is the first research effort on the analysis of the tradeoff between availability and security risk in virtualized systems with VM migration as VMM rejuvenation. We present a comprehensive set of results that provides some understanding of the availability and security risk tradeoffs raised by such a rejuvenation technique. Our security evaluation approach can be adapted for other threat models without requiring availability model modification.
Note that this paper is not intended to propose highavailability mechanisms (i.e., 99.999% of system availability [15] ) for virtualized systems with VM migration as VMM software rejuvenation. However, we aim to maximize the system availability observing the considered assumptions used in this research (more details in Section II). The focus of this paper is on the security aspect of applying VM migration scheduling as a VMM software rejuvenation technique.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our evaluation assumptions. Section III elaborates on the proposed model. Section IV presents and discusses the results. Section V Finally, Section VI puts forward conclusions and ideas for future work.
II. ASSUMPTIONS
This section states our assumptions for the proposed modeling and evaluation.
A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The system architecture considered includes three main components: Main Node, VM, and Standby Node. The Main Node represents the physical machine that runs the VM, the VM runs the target application, and the Standby Node is a standby machine used as VM Migration target. As mentioned earlier, this configuration is part of common virtualized environments. Cloud computing platforms, such as Openstack, 1 include the compute nodes that act as the Nodes of our system architecture.
We consider two major security threats in our evaluation: i) Man-in-the-middle attacks, and ii) Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. More details about the security threats are presented in the Section IV. Figure 1 depicts the system architecture.
Our previous research [7] , [11] showed software aging effects on the VMM software component. Thus, in this first work, we decided to focus on the software aging effects in the VMM component. To overcome software aging problems, we propose a software rejuvenation strategy based on VM migration. The idea behind the rejuvenation technique (explained in details in the Section II-C) is to move the VM from the physical machine (i.e., Main Node) experiencing software aging problems to another physical machine without aging accumulation (i.e., Standby Node). We consider a remote storage volume to enable VM live migration [16] . Such remote volume persists the virtual disk of the VM. Moreover, in the VM live migration algorithm, the system only has to transfer the memory pages and processor state instead of all the VM components (processor state, memory, and virtual disk).
We also consider that the VM migration process uses a pre-copy algorithm [16] . We can loosely define the pre-copy algorithm in two phases: 1) copy-phase -allocating resources on the migration target and transferring memory pages, and 2) downtime -transferring the processor state and acknowledging the migration. During the copy-phase the VM is still running and delivering service. We also highlight that the VM migration cost depends on the amount of resources used in the VM, specifically the amount of dirty memory pages and the dirty page rate.
B. FAILURE AND OPERATIONAL MODES
The system becomes non-operational after a VM failure. The system returns to operation after a VM repair. As the VM depends on the Main Node to perform its operations, failures on the Main Node affect the VM availability. After a Main Node failure, the system turns operational again by performing a two-step recovery: repair the Main Node and restart the VM. Failures on the Standby Node do not represent a system failure. Nevertheless, Standby Node failures prevent the VM migration. The proposed model also considers failures that are not related to software aging (e.g., Hardware or Operational System failures).
The model does not consider the following failures: (i) network failures; (ii) system failure during VM migration; (iii) VM Live migration failures; and (iv) failures in the remote storage volume. The inclusion of these behaviors in the proposed model may cause a state-explosion, and then turning the model reward computation too long. Therefore, we intend to cover them in our future work by applying techniques such as interacting models [17] .
C. VMM REJUVENATION TECHNIQUE
The VMM rejuvenation technique has four stages. In the first stage, the Main Node and the VM run without software aging accumulation. As the Standby Node, is not running any VMs, the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) does not suffer from software aging accumulation. As time passes, VMM software starts to experience aging accumulation. This event leads to the second stage, where the Main Node presents symptoms of software aging accumulation. When the rejuvenation interval is reached, the VM Live Migration is triggered. The next stage is the VM Live Migration. Assuming that the Standby Node is running, the VM is moved from the Main Node to the Standby Node. In the last stage, the Standby Node takes the role of Main Node. In this stage, we also perform software rejuvenation on the Main Node to clear the software aging accumulation. After software rejuvenation, that machine is ready to receive VM migrations. Thus it becomes the Standby Node. Figure 2 summarizes these steps.
D. SECURITY EVALUATION APPROACH
We propose a metric named RiskScore, which reflects the probability of the system to be in a condition that enables (or improves the likelihood of) a successful specific attack. Our approach allows the computation of the RiskScore metric for different threats using the same availability model.
To clarify the proposed approach, let us consider an illustrative example. Consider a Virtual Machine with migration capabilities. The Virtual Machine has three main states, as shown in Figure 3 . The UP state means that the VM is running, the DW state represents that the VM is down, and MG represents that the VM is migrating. The state machine diagram is presented in Figure 3 that also includes the transitions between states. In this example, we neglect possible VM failures during migration. Now, let us suppose that such a system is liable to suffer an attack related to data steal during migration. So, in this case, the only state that raises a security concern is MG. Therefore, the RiskScore is a measure based on the probability of the system being in the MG state. With this, the system manager may adjust the α parameter (which is related to the frequency of migrations) to achieve the desired levels of RiskScore.
This security evaluation approach has two main advantages: i) focus on the system state rather than on the attacker's behavior -we assume that the attacker's behavior during the attack is unpredictable. Therefore, our security evaluation method computes the security levels only from the system state; ii) security evaluation using unaltered availability models -the security evaluation approach does not require the modification of the availability models. As we obtain security levels from the system state, the evaluation is made from the steady-state probability of the system being in a specific state(s). Therefore, we can perform the security evaluation using proper model's reward measures.
We highlight that the RiskScore metric is intended to measure the security risk associated with the time spent in risky states. RiskScore does not assumes attacks characteristics as attack probability or rate. Figure 4 presents the proposed model. We adopt a monolithic model, but for this explanation let us divide two main areas of this monolithic model: a) the Clock Model composed by the places Clock and Schedule, and transitions Trigger and ResetClock; and b) the Main Model composed by the other places and transitions.
III. MODEL
The Clock Model represents the behavior of the rejuvenation scheduling on the environment. The Clock can be any type of component capable of counting time and communicating with the system. The token in the Clock place represents that the time counting to VM Migration submission is active. The deterministic transition Trigger represents the time interval between submitting VM Migration requests to the environment. When the deterministic time is reached, the Trigger transition fires putting a token in the Schedule place. The Schedule place with tokens represents that the VM Migration is about to start. However, the VM Migration start (StartLM transition firing) depends on two more conditions: 1) Main Node and VM running (a token in the UP place), and 2) Standby Node running (a token in SN_UP place). Once those conditions are satisfied, the VM Migration starts (StartLM firing). StartLM firing removes the tokens from the places UP and SN_UP and puts a token in place LM. StartLM also swaps 2 the token in the place Schedule. We use this strategy to avoid including guard functions in the model, therefore improving its readability. We highlight that the token swap does not affect token aging because the StartLM transition is an immediate transition. When the system starts the migration, 2 receives and gives back the Clock component has to start the time counting for the next VM Migration (ResetClock firing). ResetClock firing swaps the token from the LM place, and moves the token from the Schedule place to the Clock place, thus restarting the VM migration interval time counting.
Regarding the VM Migration process, when the LM place has tokens, the transition PC becomes enabled. This transition is related to the time of the copy-phase of the VM migration algorithm. We parameterized this transition based on [16] with the mean time of 72 seconds. The transition LM_dwt represents the downtime of the VM migration. As the time of VM migration may vary depending on the workload, we used exponential transitions instead of deterministic transitions. When the VM migration finishes (LM_dwt firing) the system returns to operation (a token is deposited in the UP place), and the previous Main Node will pass through software rejuvenation (a token is deposited in the SN_W place). VM migration will be enabled again after the software rejuvenation action. This behavior is represented by Rej transition firing, moving the token from the SN_W place to the SN_UP place.
We assume that the Main Node and the VM are operational at the start of the model analysis. This assumption is represented by the token in UP place. At this point, if the VM fails (represented by VM_f transition) the system goes out-ofservice (the token is removed from the UP place and deposited in the VM_DW place). If the VM is correctly repaired, then the system returns to activity. The delay time for VM repair is represented by the VM_r transition. However, the VM failure may be followed by a Main Node failure. This behavior is represented when the MN_f2 transition fires and puts a token in the DW place. A Main Node failure can also occur before a VM failure (MN_f transition firing). The system recovery after a Main Node is made in two steps: first, the Main Node repair (represented by MN_r transition firing), after the Main Node repair the VM is stopped (a token is deposited in the place VM_S. The second step of the system recovery is the VM reboot (VM_rb transition firing).
A 4-phase Erlang sub-net represents the aging accumulation process. This type of subnet can represent the Increasing Failure Rate (IFR) of a software aging accumulation process [13] . We highlight that other distributions can be applied in the software aging modeling process [18] . However, the inclusion of such distributions may require complete model redesign and are out of the scope of this paper. We selected Erlang sub-nets in the software aging modeling because it is widely adopted for this purpose [19] , [20] . The AgingPhase transition represents the phases of the Erlang sub-net. A failure caused by software aging occurs when the accumulation status reaches critical levels. In the model, this behavior is represented when the AgingFailure transition fires, removing the token in the UP place and putting it in the DW2 place. The Repair transition represents the recovering process after a software aging failure. The ClearAging and ClearAging2 transitions represent events that clear the software aging accumulation process. We consider that the Main Node and the VM repairs comprise rejuvenation actions. Therefore, the software aging accumulation cleanup occurs when the Main Node or the VM fail. The other case of software rejuvenation occurs on VM Live Migration. After VM Live Migration, the VM arrives on a fresh state VMM. Therefore, the software aging status is removed. We used inhibitor arcs 3 from the UP place to the ClearAging and ClearAging2 transitions to represent the behaviors related to software rejuvenation.
The model also covers Standby Node failures, which affect system availability indirectly as it prevents VM migration turning a software aging failure more likely to occur. The transitions SN_f and SN_r represent the Standby Node failure and repair events, respectively. The places SN_UP 3 arc terminating in a circle instead of an arrow and SN_DW are related to the Standby Node availability and unavailability, respectively. Table 1 summarizes the immediate transitions, their meaning, and their input and output arcs with respective weights. 4 For the sake of readability, we present the list of the places used in our model. Table 2 presents the information about the places. The column meaning with tokens represents the system state when the considered place has tokens.
Our availability model comprises software aging and rejuvenation behavior, non-aging failures and details of VM migration (e.g., pre-copy and downtime phases). However, we applied some simplifications to avoid the state explosion problem. 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The numerical evaluations of the models are obtained using the TimeNET tool [21] . Table 3 contains the parameters used in our evaluation. These parameters are based on previous experimental studies and consolidated papers [11] , [16] , [22] .
For the three case studies, we compute the system unavailability using the following: Unavailability = 1 − Availability. Availability is obtained through Availability = P(#UP > 0)OR(#LM > 0), where we are computing the probability of token presence in the places UP or LM. In other words, we obtain the system availability observing the probability of the system being running or in the copy-phase of VM migration. Unavailability is the probability that the system is out of such a state.
A. CASE STUDY 1 -MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
In Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, the attacker has access to the data link between two communication endpoints [23] With such access, the attacker can deploy attacks to change the network traffic or to eavesdrop the communication [24] . Even with proper VM migration data traffic encryption, an attacker may recognize the migrating VMs in the network.
1) THREAT MODEL
We consider an attacker that has the necessary skills to hijack the VM migration route and to perform a malicious action (e.g., secretly copying the data in traffic, changing or destroying the data in the VM migration packets).
As we are using VM migration scheduling for VMM rejuvenation purposes, frequent migrations may raise the concern regarding this type of attack. We compute the RiskScore of this case study with the following expression: RiskScore = MigrationProbability. The MigrationProbability is the probability of the system on a VM migration. We obtain MigrationProbability by observing the probability of token presence in places LM or DW_mig. We use the following metric: MigrationProbability = P(#LM > 0) OR (#DW _Mig > 0), where P{} refers to probability and #LM and #DW _Mig refer to the number of tokens in the LM and DW_Mig places, respectively. Figure 5 presents the results obtained. The Y-axis represents the system unavailability, and the X-axis represents the rejuvenation trigger considered (in hours). We add a secondary Y-axis in the right side with the values of the RiskScore. The black dotted line represents unavailability, and the gray dotted line is the RiskScore. We vary the rejuvenation trigger from one hour to 168 hours (a week) with a half-hour step. We highlight that the RiskScore in this case study only considers the probability that the system is performing a VM migration. Figure 5 shows a valley for the system unavailability values. This point represents the rejuvenation trigger that maximizes system availability. It shows the balance between too frequent rejuvenation that may impair availability due to each migration downtime, and less frequent migrations that raise the probability of software aging failures. Besides that, it is noticeable that, as expected, less frequent migrations reduces the security risk associated with MITM attacks.
2) RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Unavailability and RiskScore are non-benefitial metrics (i.e. the lower the better). The plot in the Figure 6 presents the normalized values for Unavailability versus the normalizes values for RiskScore. We decided to normalize the data to reduce possible bias due to the difference in magnitude of the metrics. We apply a simple normalization, as follows: Norm(UA (n) ) = UA (n) /Max(UA), where Norm(UA (n) ) is the normalized value of Unavailability when applying rejuvenation interval of n hours, UA (n) is the actual Unavailability value when using rejuvenation interval of n hours, and, Max(UA) is the maximum observed value of Unavailability in the considered rejuvenation interval range of values (i.e. from one hour to 168 hours, using a half-hour step).
In Figure 6 , the point in the curve with the minimum distance to the origin (0,0) represents the configuration that globally reduces the combination of Unavailability and RiskScore. We computed the Euclidean distance of all the points of the curve to the origin point. The point with the shortest distance corresponds to the rejuvenation policy with VM migration interval of 20 hours. The detailed results are presented in Table 4 (Scenario #0).
Our analysis also aims at finding the rejuvenation policies that minimize the values of Unavailability or RiskScore or even a composition of both. By composition, we mean the desired proportion of each metric. For example, a system manager may want to deploy a specific VM migration policy that considers both metrics (Unavailability and RiskScore) equally (50% Unavailability and 50% RiskScore), or some other values. We computed some intermediate scenarios using proportions for both metrics. To avoid decision bias, we used the normalized data mentioned earlier. The results are shown in Table 4 , which includes the following: Scn # -Proposed scenario; Criteria -considered proportion for each metric in the composition; Rej. Trigger -specific VM migration policy observing the desired criteria; UNAVAILABILITY -steady-state unavailability; Downtime (h/yr) -estimated downtime in hours per year; RISKSCORE -steady-state risk score; and Risk classification -a comparison between the obtained RiskScore and the maximum RiskScore observed in the analysis 5 (MaxRS). The Risk classification result provides a proportion of the increase/reduction impact due to the selected VM migration policy when compared to the scenario with the worse security levels. Thus, Risk classification results are useful to understand the actual levels of security improvement when applying the VM migration policies.
Each case study results presented in this paper provide the necessary inputs for answering RQ s1 and RQ s2 . The answer for the RQ s1 is on the tables with the case studies results in the scenario which minimizes RiskScore metric (100% Risk row on the results table). The plots and tables in each case study provide the information for answering RQ s2 .
From the results, we can observe that the rejuvenation policy decision depends on the system manager criteria about Unavailability and RiskScore. We provide a comprehensive set of results to support such a decision. We highlight the following conclusions from this case study: 1) a VM migration interval of 20 hours provides the best overall rejuvenation policy considering both metrics equally; 2) when putting more weight on Unavailability in the rejuvenation policy decision, the VM migration interval tends to be shorter than in scenarios with more weight on RiskScore; and 3) longer VM migration intervals provide the best RiskScore result. We recall that the maximum limit of our analysis is 168 hours. As Man-in-the-middle attacks depend on VM migration, less frequent migrations will reduce the value of RiskScore.
B. CASE STUDY 2 -DENIAL OF SERVICE (DOS) ATTACK
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are the main threats for Cloud Computing availability [25] . Cloud Computing DoS attacks usually aim at flood the network resources or impair the application running on the VMs. DoS attacks are even more devastating on Cloud because of its flexibility. So, when receiving a high workload, the Cloud environment starts to allocate more resources (i.e., servers and VMs) to handle the incoming requests. Therefore, by flooding just one of the servers, the DoS attack may end up affecting the overall Cloud Computing availability.
1) THREAT MODEL
The considered DoS attack consists of a high workload demand for an application running upon a VM. So, the RiskScore metric for this case study has to cover both aspects: network and application state. The reasoning is that the VM migration process affects the network state, and software aging affects the application state. Besides that, software aging accumulation forces the system to use more memory. Thus, software aging accumulation also affects the VM migration network overhead as there are more dirty memory pages.
We compose the RiskScore for this case study as follows. RiskScore = (w1 × RiskMigration) + (w2 × RiskAging). w1 and w2 are the assigned weights for VM migration security risk and software aging security risk, respectively. As VM migration produces high bursty network traffic, we assign more weight to RiskMigration. In practice, the weight configuration is w1 = 0.6 and w2 = 0.4. RiskAging is the expected software aging accumulation. We compute the RiskAging from the expected number of tokens in the place Accumulation (see model in Fig. 4 ). The RiskMigration is obtained using the equation: RiskMigration = MigProbability × RiskAging, where MigProbability is the probability of the system being performing a VM migration (as in the previous case study). We decided to add the RiskAging in the RiskMigration to capture the following behavior: a migration of a VM with more accumulation of software aging will produce a higher impact in the network than a VM with less software aging accumulation.
2) RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Figure 7 presents the obtained results. As in the previous case study, the black lines are related to the system unavailability, and the gray lines are related to the RiskScore metric. We also added a secondary y-axis with the scale for the RiskScore values. The plot also contains two continuous lines for the baseline (i.e., without software rejuvenation) architecture. The variation of the VM migration scheduling obeys to the one presented earlier, from one hour to a week (168 hours) with half-hour steps.
The gray lines interception represents the point where the VM migration scheduling is no longer beneficial for the RiskScore when compared to the baseline. The exact intercept is when the rejuvenation interval is equal to 57 hours, which means that larger rejuvenation intervals produce worse security results than the system without VM migration scheduling. Figure 8 presents the normalized results for both metrics, Unavailability and RiskScore. We computed the same set of scenarios of the previous case study. The results are presented in Table 5 (see the previous section for the meaning of the columns in the table).
We highlight three key conclusions from the results. First, the best overall rejuvenation policy, which globally minimizes both Unavailability and RiskScore, has a VM migration interval of 12 hours. Second, RiskScore raises with the increase of the VM migration interval. As the time that a VM spends migrating is substantially lower than the time that a VM spends running, the software aging accumulation is the most relevant aspect for the RiskScore metric in this scenario. More frequent migrations may produce network overhead, but, also avoid severe software aging accumulation. Therefore, more frequent migrations result in less software aging accumulation, and thus a lower RiskScore. The last conclusion is that the criteria focused on minimizing RiskScore produces more reduction when compared to the previous case study.
C. CASE STUDY 3 -COMPOSITION OF ATTACKS
In the previous case studies, we presented the analysis for the two threats separately (DoS and MITM). However, in some context, we may need to deal with both threats simultaneously. Therefore, we present a study case that combines the three metrics of interest: Unavailability, RiskScore of MITM (RS-MITM) and RiskScore of DoS (RS-DoS). Figure 9 shows that the RS-MITM value is smaller than the RS-DoS value. RS-MITM considers only VM migration as a security risk. Therefore its absolute values are related to the steady-state probability that the system is performing a VM migration. In a stationary perspective, the time that the system spends on a migration state is lower than the time that it spends on a normal operation (i.e., running and accumulating software aging effects).
It is, however, hard to set up a direct comparison between both RiskScore metrics due to the different nature of the threats. Just comparing the absolute values of the two metrics may not be enough for a tradeoff analysis. For example, the consequences of a MITM attack may be more critical than the consequences of a DoS attack (depending on the business context; e.g., MITM attacks can try to affect system confidentiality, which can be devastating for some types of organizations). If we compare only the absolute values, we tend to neglect the influence of each threat in the overall system security. So, we normalized the data to provide a more fair tradeoff analysis. The normalization allows us to deal with a maximum and minimum range of our data. The normalization approach is the one used in the previous case studies. Figure 10 presents a 3d plot with the results for each normalized metric. We added shades (in gray) for each point of the 3d plot in the xy and yz planes.
Due to the different nature of the considered threats (MITM and DoS), we decided to neglect a general formula for RiskScore calculation for this particular case study. The general formula results may hide how much RiskScore is due to the MITM or DoS threats.
We can use the data from Figure 10 to find the optimal policy when considering Unavailability, RS-MITM and RS-DoS. We obtain the best overall policy by finding the point with the shortest distance for the origin (point (0,0,0)). We compute such a distance using the Euclidean Distance. We also present some alternative scenarios with different weight configurations for the three metrics. Table 6 presents the results. The columns % UA and % MITM and % DoS show the weight for each metric. The columns MR-MITM and MR-DoS represents the RiskScore reduction when compared to the maximum observed RiskScore of MITM and DoS, respectively. As in the previous case studies, we assume that the VM migration interval range between 1 and 168 hours. The remaining columns have the same meaning as presented in the previous cases.
We highlight the following from this study case: 1) the policy that globally reduces the three metrics has the VM migration interval of 13.5 hours; 2) results from scenarios 5 and 7 reveal that migration policies for RS-MITM and RS-DoS are incompatible, thus trying to reduce one metric will increase the other (the results presented offer relevant information regarding finding the best balance); and 3) an interesting approach for decision making in such complex scenarios is the definition of unacceptable service levels instead of desired service levels, which allows us to remove the worse solutions from the decision-making process.
V. RELATED WORK
Matos et al. [26] and Dantas et al. [27] present analytical models for cloud computing availability evaluation and VOLUME 7, 2019 sensitivity analysis. The papers deal with virtualized scenarios with and without redundancy. Their work provides a relevant background for our availability model design. However, none of these papers deal with software aging or security evaluation.
The papers from Machida et al. [13] , [19] provide useful insights for our modeling framework design. Our previous papers [10] , [20] were the first step of our research endeavor in availability evaluation of VM migration scheduling for VMM rejuvenation purposes. The model present in this research was based on our previous work published in [11] , which was focused on power consumption evaluation. Different from all these papers, we are now focused on the security aspects of the virtualized system with VMM rejuvenation based on VM migration scheduling.
Nguyen et al. [28] , [29] provide a comprehensive dependability modeling of virtualized data centers. Their work covers the reliability and availability of different scenarios and virtualized architectures. The presented analysis also covers secondary aspects as power consumption and cost. Besides that, the proposed models also include software aging and rejuvenation behaviors. Different from those authors, we present a security-oriented analysis to measure the RiskScore associated with rejuvenation policies based on VM migration.
Moving Target Defense (MTD) consists of dynamically changing the available attack surface to ''confuse'' or to nullify attackers' knowledge about the environment [30] . VM migration is among the MTD techniques used on Cloud Computing environments [31] . Alavizadeh et al. [32] , [33] present a modeling framework for security evaluation of MTD on Cloud Computing environments. The authors use a Hierarchical Attack Representation Models (HARM) to evaluate metrics as System Risk, Attack Cost, Return on attack, and Availability. Their results comprise a combination of different MTD techniques. Although we are also considering VM migration in a security evaluation context, our goal is to evaluate the security impacts caused by VM migration scheduling for software rejuvenation purposes. Besides that, different from [32] , [33] , our models comprise software aging aspects.
Aung and Park [34] presents an approach to apply software rejuvenation as a security defense. The idea is to perform rejuvenation actions to kill attackers' processes and shutdown unauthorized connections. The paper presents experimental results based on attack free and attacks data sets. The paper neglects system availability evaluation. Table 7 summarizes the scope of the related works above in contrast with the current paper.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented a comprehensive evaluation of the availability and security of virtualized systems with VMM rejuvenation enabled by VM migration scheduling. Our results provide a tradeoff analysis in three case studies: 1) Man-in-the-middle (MITM), 2) Denial of Service (DoS), and 3) combination of MITM and DoS attacks. Each case study provides a set of scenarios comprising the optimal rejuvenation scheduling, and intermediary configurations of weights for security and availability, providing more information for the decision making process.
Our security evaluation approach is flexible and can consider other threat models and be used in other modeling frameworks (e.g., performance models and Markov Chains). The final results show that reducing the risk associated with the Man-in-the-middle attack is incompatible with reducing the risk related to Denial of Service, as policies reducing one tends to increase the other.
Regarding our main research question, RQ main -What is the security impact caused by applying different VM migration policies for VMM software rejuvenation purposes?, We perceived that the security impact depends on the security threats considered. Specifically about our case studies, we highlight: i) when considering only MITM attacks, VM migration frequency determines the system RiskScore levels; ii) when considering only DoS attacks, the time spent on a state with software aging accumulation is the most critical factor for system RiskScore; iii) when considering both threats, rejuvenation policies that reduce DoS RiskScore are preferred because the system tends to stay more time in a state with software aging accumulation than ''in migration''.
There are several future research directions. We aim to investigate other threat models as penetration attacks and specific domains of Denial of Service (e.g., buffer overflow or web server overload). We also aim at expanding the proposed model for more prominent system architectures (e.g., including multiple VMs). Besides that, we intend to gradually increase our model scope by adding more kinds of dependability and security events. A possible approach is to expand the models using the interacting models method. Future work may also consider including specific business models (e.g., a virtualized system of the financial market) in the modeling framework.
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